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FAR FROM THE MADDENING CROWD: DOES 
THE JOBS ACT PROVIDE MEANINGFUL 
REDRESS TO SMALL INVESTORS FOR 
SECURITIES FRAUD IN CONNECTION WITH 
CROWDFUNDING OFFERINGS? 
Abstract: Title III of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act 
provides a “crowdfunding” exemption from securities registration for 
small issuers to publicly offer up to $1 million in equity securities during a 
twelve-month period. Issuers will conduct crowdfunding offerings through 
online social networks as a means of reaching a myriad of potential inves-
tors. Although Title III requires crowdfunding issuers to disclose informa-
tion about the startup’s business and the securities being offered, many 
small investors will lack the financial sophistication to understand their in-
vestments and bear a higher risk of becoming victims of fraudulent offer-
ings. In the likely event of issuer fraud, the economic incentives of crowd-
funding make the class action vehicle a virtual prerequisite for small 
investors seeking to recoup their lost investments. The procedural hurdles 
erected by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the 
“PSLRA”), however, would eliminate the efficacy of Title III’s private right 
of action and thus impede, if not entirely prevent, small defrauded crowd-
funding investors from adequate redress. Yet class actions brought by small 
crowdfunding investors would not implicate the policy concerns that 
prompted the passage of the PSLRA. In order to create a truly viable 
crowdfunding exemption, Congress should carve out an exception to the 
PSLRA for class action lawsuits alleging fraud in connection with crowd-
funding offerings. 
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If the country is to flourish, capital must be invested in enterprise. But those 
who seek to draw upon other people’s money must be wholly candid regarding 
facts on which the investor’s judgment is asked. 
—Franklin D. Roosevelt1 
Introduction 
 Signed into law by President Barack Obama on April 5, 2012, the 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act seeks to afford startups 
access to previously unavailable capital in order to grow the American 
economy.2 Title III of the JOBS Act amends Section 4(a)(6) of the Se-
curities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), to allow startups 
to offer up to $1 million worth of their securities to the public during a 
twelve-month period.3 These “crowdfunding” offerings would, in the-
ory, allow startups to solicit potential investors through online social 
networks and grant startups access to a previously untapped well of cap-
ital.4 Although lending and donation-based crowdfunding websites 
have experienced tremendous success in raising capital for small en-
terprises, Title III goes a step further in allowing investors to purchase 
an equity stake in the startup itself.5 
 Although Title III could provide marginalized startups with a 
much-needed capital injection through crowdfunding offerings, poten-
tial crowdfunding investors may face serious hazards.6 Purchasing a 
startup’s securities may expose small unsophisticated investors to un-
known financial risks and higher incidents of issuer fraud.7 Small un-
                                                                                                                      
 
1 President Franklin Roosevelt, Message to Congress (May 27, 1933), in 2 Public Pa-
pers and Addresses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt 214 (Samuel I. Roseman ed., 
1938). 
2 See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 302(a), § 4(a)(6), 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012)). 
3 Id. 
4 Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Crowdfrauding? Social Networks and the Securities 
Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 
N.C. L. Rev. 1735, 1736–37 (2012). 
5 C. Steven Bradford, Fraudfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 Colum. Bus. L. 
Rev. 1, 11 (noting that peer-to-peer lending crowdfunding websites alone have raised an 
estimated $1 billion in funding and will likely exceed $5 billion by 2013). 
6 Heather L. Traeger et al., Democratizing Entrepreneurship: An Overview of the Past, Pre-
sent, and Future of Crowdfunding, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep., Feb. 4, 2013, at 208, 214. 
7 See 158 Cong. Rec. S1776 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin) 
[hereinafter Statement of Sen. Levin]. According to Senator Carl Levin: 
The problem is that in the guise of job creation, this legislation rolls back im-
portant investor protections and transparency requirements that are funda-
mental to our capital markets. Under the legislation the House has sent us, 
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sophisticated investors generally lack the necessary financial acumen to 
understand the nuances of investing—especially concepts related to 
financial risk, portfolio management, and limiting exposure.8 Crowd-
funding investors lacking financial know-how stand to gain little from 
Title III’s requirement that startups issuing securities provide disclo-
sures to investors.9 Additionally, many startups will not have done 
enough business to have generated sufficient financial information to 
disclose to potential investors.10 Furthermore, assuming that crowd-
funding investors understood the information disclosed by the issuer, 
even seasoned investors would find evaluating and verifying the quality 
of that information difficult.11 Finally, small investors lacking financial 
acumen are unlikely to have sufficient investable assets to withstand a 
loss of their entire investment in the event of fraud.12 
 Although Title III affords crowdfunding investors a private right of 
action in the event of issuer fraud, small investors may—in practice— 
lack the ability to sue crowdfunding issuers for securities fraud.13 Inves-
tors bringing suit under Title III’s private right of action may only re-
cover up to the amount invested, which for small investors may amount 
to less than the cost of bringing suit in the first place.14 Given the eco-
nomic disincentives for bringing a securities fraud action against a 
crowdfunding issuer, a class action lawsuit is the only economically fea-
 
investors will know less about the companies they are solicited to invest in, 
they will have less confidence those companies follow standard accounting 
practices, they will have no assurance that the solicitation they have just re-
ceived over the Internet or by telephone is for a legitimate company and not 
for a boiler room fraud operation. 
Id. 
8 Bradford, supra note 5, at 112. 
9 See Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation § 1.2 (5th ed. 2005). 
10 Yoichiro Taku, Crowdfunding: Its Practical Effects May Be Unclear Until SEC Rulemaking 
Is Complete, Bus. L. Today, May 2012, at 3. 
11 Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2 J. Small 
& Emerging Bus. L. 57, 78 (1998). 
12 C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promises Unfulfilled, 40 
Sec. Reg. L.J. 1, 18 (2012). 
13 Phyllis Diamond, Litigation Reform May Be Problematic in New JOBS Act Era, NASAA’s 
Abshure Says, Sec. Reg. L. & Rep., Oct. 1, 2012, at 1838, 1838 (illustrating the fears of the 
President of the North American Securities Administrators Association that these crowd-
funding offers may be litigation-proof); see JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 302(b), 
§ 4A(c)(2)(A), 126 Stat. 306 (2012). 
14 See JOBS Act, at sec. 302(b), § 4A(c) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)); see also Ha-
zen, supra note 4, at 1759 (“[A] relatively small crowdfunding effort will result in relatively 
modest potential damages, thus raising questions regarding the economics of bringing 
such a claim and the adequacy of the economic incentives to plaintiff’s law firms to bring 
suit . . . .”). 
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sible option for small individual investors.15 Unfortunately, the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the “PSLRA”) would effec-
tively prevent classes of small defrauded crowdfunding investors from 
the advantages of Title III’s private right of action.16 The PSLRA, which 
operates to prevent manufactured plaintiff classes from bringing merit-
less securities fraud suits against issuers seeking settlement, would re-
quire classes of small defrauded crowdfunding investors to plead sci-
enter as well as loss causation with particularity.17 Because many fledgling 
startups are unlikely to have generated much financial information 
(e.g., tax returns or audited financial statements), defrauded crowd-
funding investors would find that meeting the PSLRA’s heightened 
pleading requirements difficult, if not impossible.18 The PSLRA’s 
heightened pleading requirements could, therefore, effectively elimi-
nate plaintiffs’ already limited remedies under Title III’s private right of 
action, creating “litigation-proof” offerings.19 
 Despite the federal interest in deterring meritless class action secu-
rities fraud lawsuits, the PSLRA should not curb classes of small de-
frauded crowdfunding investors from seeking redress under Title III’s 
private right of action.20 Because the perceived abuses of the class ac-
tion vehicle in securities fraud litigation would likely be absent from 
crowdfunding securities litigation, such a lawsuit would not implicate 
the public policy goals underlying the PSLRA.21 For example, startups 
raising capital through crowdfunding offerings lack large asset bases by 
definition, giving plaintiff classes no incentive to shake down issuers for 
lucrative settlements without regard to culpability.22 Similarly, Title III 
prevents individual investors from recovering anything in excess of “the 
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon,” which in 
                                                                                                                      
15 See Diamond, supra note 13, at 1840. 
16 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 
(2012). 
17 Id. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A), (b)(4) (imposing heightened burdens on class action securi-
ties fraud suits). 
18 See Taku, supra note 10, at 3. 
19 See Diamond, supra note 13, at 1838. 
20 See id.; see also § 78u-4(b) (imposing heightened burdens on class action securities 
fraud suits). 
21 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). Congress was particularly con-
cerned with vexatious litigation that targeted deep-pocketed defendants such as account-
ants, underwriters, and individuals who may have large insurance policies. Id. None of 
these individuals, however, are common in small startups. See Abraham J.B. Cable, Fending 
for Themselves: Why Securities Regulations Should Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 
107, 120 (2010) (noting that startups typically lack sufficient sources of funding after they 
have exhausted personal resources and before attracting venture capital funds). 
22 See id. (indicating that deep pockets may incentivize meritless litigation). 
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turn would prevent plaintiff classes from seeking extortionate sums 
from crowdfunding issuers.23 As such, Congress should carve out class 
action lawsuits brought under Title III’s private right of action from 
coverage by the PSLRA.24 
 Part I of this Note examines the need for legislation addressing the 
financing difficulties of startups and Title III’s disclosure requirements 
geared towards investor protection.25 Part II discusses whether such re-
quirements sufficiently protect small unsophisticated crowdfunding in-
vestors from issuer fraud.26 Part III then examines whether Title III’s 
private right of action provides small defrauded investors with economi-
cally feasible recourse in the event of issuer fraud and concludes that 
the PSLRA effectively precludes small investor redress by way of the class 
action vehicle.27 Finally, Part IV argues that class action lawsuits brought 
by small defrauded investors against crowdfunding issuers would not 
undermine the policies on which the PSLRA rests.28 As such, this Note 
suggests that Congress should carve out a crowdfunding exception in 
the PSLRA in order to create a workable crowdfunding exemption.29 
I. Crowdfunding and Federal Securities Laws 
 In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and ensuing credit crunch, 
small business startups continue to face mounting challenges in locat-
ing scarce capital needed to grow and stay solvent.30 Frequently, start-
ups will not qualify for loans from traditional institutional investors, 
such as banks, because of the risks associated with emerging growth.31 
Similarly, smaller startups tend not to attract the attention and benevo-
 
23 See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 302(b), § 4A(c)(1)(A), 126 Stat. 306 (2012) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(1)(A) (2012)). 
24 See Diamond, supra note 13, at 1840; Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(PSLRA) of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2012) (imposing heightened burdens on class 
action securities fraud suits). 
25 See infra notes 30–87 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 88–154 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 155–216 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 217–258 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 242–258 and accompanying text. 
30 See generally Tanya Prive, What Is Crowdfunding and How Does It Benefit the Economy, 
Forbes, Nov. 27, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/11/27/what-is-crowd 
funding-and-how-does-it-benefit-the-economy/ (noting that, to obtain capital in the post-
recession world, startups have increasingly turned to online crowdfunding platforms such as 
Kiva and RocketHub). 
31 Bradford, supra note 5, at 5. 
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lence of “angel investors” or venture capital funds.32 These challenges 
force startups to solicit relatives and friends for funding, which is usu-
ally insufficient to support the majority of emerging businesses.33 
 In the absence of traditional seed money, small startups have re-
cently seized upon donation-based crowdfunding as a low-cost means of 
locating potential investors and raising capital.34 The term “crowdfund-
ing” refers to the solicitation of capital from many individual investors 
in small amounts over the Internet—a process that offers startups ac-
cess to capital that they might not otherwise receive through traditional 
channels.35 Donation-based crowdfunding, in particular, has connected 
startups to a nearly unlimited well of untapped capital through preex-
isting online social networks.36 The proliferation of online social net-
works within the past five years has allowed startups to access millions of 
potential investors in real time, with no incremental cost.37 For exam-
ple, peer-to-peer lending websites such as Kickstarter and Kiva allow 
startups to seek funding from donors around the world, usually in the 
form of small gifts.38 Larger, well-publicized ventures may receive sub-
stantial donations of several million dollars.39 One scholar has esti-
mated that peer-to-peer lending alone has raised an estimated $1 bil-
lion in funding for small businesses and will likely exceed $5 billion by 
the end of 2013.40 
                                                                                                                     
 Donation-based crowdfunding websites offer sufficient funding to 
artists, musicians, and the like, but donations alone are unlikely to pro-
 
32 Brian C. Bonner & Laura H. Huggins, “Angel” Investors: Using the Internet in the Private 
Offering of Securities, 11 S.C. Law., 26, 27 (2000). Angel investors are wealthy individuals 
who privately finance startup ventures, often in exchange for some sort of stake in the 
business. Id. 
33 Id. at 27. Mingling friends and family into the already tense atmosphere that per-
vades most business startups also tends to increase stress on the business management and 
by extension decrease the likelihood of long-term success. Id. 
34 See generally Jenna Wortham, Startups Look to the Crowd, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 2012, at B1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/30/technology/kickstarter-sets-off-financing- 
rush-for-a-watch-not-yet-made.html?pagewanted=all (describing the process of funding a 
wristwatch startup through Kickstarter.com as “equivalent to what a young company would 
get in a second round of venture capital financing”). 
35 Bradford, supra note 5, at 5. 
36 Hazen, supra note 4, at 1736–37. 
37 Stuart R. Cohn & Gregory C. Yadley, Capital Offense: The SEC’s Continuing Failure to 
Address Small Business Financing Concerns, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 1, 6 (2007). 
38 Bradford, supra note 5, at 10. The “peer-to-peer model” commonly involves tempo-
rary loans from contributors, with or without interest, subject to immediate repayment. Id. 
39 See, e.g., Cease and Desist Order, Securities Act Release No. 9216, 2011 WL 2246317 
( June 8, 2011) (illustrating how five million people contributed a total of $200 million to 
two advertising executives seeking to purchase Pabst Brewing Co.). 
40 Bradford, supra note 5, at 11. 
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vide the level of investments necessary for business startups.41 One 
method of solving this problem would be to offer investors a stake in 
the startup’s future earnings, which would likely encourage more con-
sistent investment and lead to more startup success.42 This paradigm 
would allow startups to collect small amounts of money from many in-
vestors who would share in business returns.43 
 Although offering investors equity in a startup helps solve the prob-
lem of attracting and maintaining sufficient capital for long-term 
growth, such offerings likely would implicate federal securities laws.44 
Unlike donations, which do not offer returns to the donor, crowdfund-
ing equity securities would likely fall within the meaning of “investment 
contracts.”45 As a result, they would constitute securities for purposes of 
the registration requirements of the Securities Act and the periodic dis-
closure requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amend-
ed (the “Exchange Act”).46 The costs associated with observing applica-
ble securities regulations, in particular registration under Section 5 of 
the Securities Act, would likely exceed the financing available to startups 
through a public offering.47 
 
 
41 See id. at 12, 16. Although crowdfunding has experienced tremendous popularity in 
its use in the entertainment industry, none of the prominent crowdfunding sites used by 
businesses and entrepreneurs actually use the donation model. See id. 
42 See id. at 24. 
43 Id. at 22. 
44 See Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execu-
tion, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 1433, 1435 (2012). 
45 Hazen, supra note 4, at 1740. Investment contracts are construed broadly to include 
any contract, arrangement, or scheme in which an individual invests money in a “common 
enterprise” with the expectation of profit from the efforts of others. See SEC v. W.J. Howey 
Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946) (noting that the term “security” is defined in § 77b(a)(1) 
of the Securities Act by way of a non-exhaustive list, which includes investment contracts, 
stocks, bonds debentures, evidences of indebtedness, and options). 
46 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b) (2012) (requiring all securi-
ties traded on the securities exchanges to be registered under Sections 12(a) and 12(b) of 
the Exchange Act); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012) (including in-
vestment contracts within the definition of “security”). Under Section 5 of the Securities 
Act, prospect issuers must file forms with the SEC prior to offering securities in a process 
known as “registration.” See Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, http://www.sec.gov/answers/regis33.htm (last modified Sept. 2, 2011). These 
forms, which include the registration statement and prospectus, include information for 
investors such as a description of the issuer’s properties and business as well as a descrip-
tion of the securities being offered, information about the issuer’s managements, and 
audited financial statements. See id. 
47 Joan MacLeod Hemingway & Sheldon Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowd-
funding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 879, 910 (2011). Section 5 of the 
Securities Act requires offerors to both register their offerings with the SEC and to file 
disclosure documents. Id. These processes entail a litany of fees for underwriters, legal 
1774 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1767 
 This Part describes the manner in which the JOBS Act addresses 
the capital needs of startups by creating a crowdfunding exemption 
from securities registration and the subsequent problems this may gen-
erate for small, unsophisticated investors.48 Section A examines the sub-
stance of Title III in relation to federal securities laws’ overarching con-
cern with investor protection.49 Section B then discusses the scheme of 
mandatory issuer disclosures set forth in Title III and questions their 
efficacy.50 
A. The JOBS Act: What Is It and How Does It Work? 
 In the absence of any viable preexisting Securities Act registration 
exemptions, the JOBS Act sought to allow startups to easily raise capital 
in the capital markets.51 Noting the correlation between the declining 
number of initial public offerings (“IPO”) and stagnant job creation,52 
Congress sought to stimulate the domestic job market by reinvigorating 
the domestic IPO market.53 Without easy access to capital, startups that 
might have otherwise gone public were unable to do so, failing to cre-
ate needed jobs.54 
 Title III of the JOBS Act directly addresses the dearth of funding 
options for startups by creating a new registration exemption for crowd-
                                                                                                                      
counsel, electronic filings, accountants, broker-dealers, and stock exchange listings, as well 
as the fees owed to the SEC and state securities regulators. Id. For most startups, the costs 
associated with registration would therefore exceed $100,000 for third-party expenses 
alone, which is less than they would likely raise. Id.; see also Marvin E. Rooks, It Is Time for 
the Federal Trade Commission to Require Financial Performance Representations to Prospective Fran-
chisees, 11 Wake Forest J. Bus. & Intell. Prop. L. 55, 66 (2010) (noting that the costs 
associated with registering an initial public offering (“IPO”) with the SEC for a business 
with less than $20 million in revenue often exceeds $100,000 and may take in excess of six 
months). 
48 See infra notes 51–87 and accompanying text. 
49 See infra notes 51–60 and accompanying text. 
50 See infra notes 61–87 and accompanying text. 
51 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012, H.R. 3606, 112th Cong. (2012), avail-
able at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr3606rh/pdf/BILLS-112hr3606rh.pdf (“A 
bill to increase American job creation and economic growth by improving access to the pub-
lic capital markets for emerging growth companies.”). 
52 H.R. Rep. No. 112-406, at 7 (2011) (noting that, according to the President’s Coun-
cil on Jobs and Competitiveness, 90% of jobs created by startup companies are created 
after their IPO). 
53 See id. Congress observed that in 2010, U.S. capital markets raised only 15% of glob-
al IPO proceeds, in contrast to 28% over the past decade, and further emphasized that 
10% of U.S. companies that did go public in 2010 did so outside of the United States. Id. 
54 Id. 
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funding.55 Title III amends Section 4(6) of the Securities Act to allow 
for unregistered offerings of up to $1 million during a twelve-month 
period.56 At the same time, Title III limits the maximum amount an in-
dividual can invest in a crowdfunding offering based on the investor’s 
financial status.57 An investor with either an annual income or net worth 
exceeding $100,000 may invest up to $10,000 annually.58 Conversely, an 
investor whose net worth or annual income is less than $100,000 is lim-
ited to investing up to $2000 annually.59 Furthermore, investors may not 
resell the securities purchased in connection with a crowdfunding offer-
ing within one year of the date of purchase absent limited circum-
stances, making any crowdfunding securities highly illiquid.60 
B. Disclosure Requirements Under the JOBS Act 
 To effectively protect investors from fraud, a crowdfunding exemp-
tion must compel issuers to disclose sufficient information with which 
investors can make informed investments.61 Investor protection is par-
amount among policy considerations underlying federal securities 
laws.62 The Securities Act assumes that full and fair disclosure best pro-
tects investors from securities fraud.63 Armed with the requisite knowl-
 
55 See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 302(a), § 4(a)(6), 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012)). Although the Securities Act offers several exemp-
tions from the onerous registration requirements for small businesses, none adequately fit 
the specific needs of crowdfunding issuers. Hemingway & Hoffman, supra note 47, at 911. 
56 JOBS Act, at sec. 302(a), § 4(a)(6). An “unregistered security” refers to a security for 
which an effective registration statement has not been filed. Katie Adams, Frequently Asked 
Question: What Are Unregistered Securities or Stocks?, Investopedia (May 1, 2009), http://www. 
investopedia.com/ask/answers/08/unregistered-securities.asp. In the absence of a regis-
tration exemption, the sale or attempted sale of an unregistered security is a felony. Id. 
57 JOBS Act, at sec. 302(a), § 4(a)(6)(A). The investment limitations seek to limit loss, as-
suming that investors with a larger annual income or net worth can bear the risk of a lost 
investment and/or are more sophisticated than an investor with a smaller net worth or an-
nual income. See id. at sec. 302(a), § 4(a)(6)(B)(i). 
58 Id. at sec. 302(a), § 4(a)(6)(B)(ii). 
59 Id. at sec. 302(a), § 4(a)(6)(B)(i). 
60 See id. at sec. 302(b), § 4A(e)(1). 
61 See Hazen, supra note 4, at 1737 (“Only with meaningful disclosure to investors can 
an exemption strike the right balance to encourage small business financing without un-
duly sacrificing investor protection.”). 
62 See Hazen, supra note 9, § 1.2. Unlike real or personal property, securities are com-
plex investment vehicles without physical presence and thus lay beyond the grasp of most 
novice investors. Id. The abstract notion of value embodied in securities facilitates both 
fraud and manipulation. Id. 
63 Id. 
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edge, the individual investor stands to make the best decision about 
whether to purchase the security.64 
 In keeping with the Securities Act’s emphasis on investor protec-
tion through adequate information, Title III requires issuers to provide 
investors with certain disclosures and to file them with the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC).65 In addition to the issuer’s name, physi-
cal address, and URL address, Title III requires the issuer to provide 
information about the nature of the startup, including the names of 
the directors and a description of the issuer’s ownership and capital 
structure.66 The issuer must also disclose a description of the current 
business, the anticipated business plan, a description of the stated pur-
pose and intended use of the proceeds of the offering sought by the 
issuer, and the target amount of funding sought from the offering.67 
Furthermore, the issuer must disclose its financial condition, which 
may include income tax filings and audited financial statements.68 
 Title III additionally compels the issuer to disclose information 
about the securities being offered.69 Before any crowdfunding offering, 
the issuer must disclose either the public price of the security or the 
means of determining that price.70 Required information includes the 
number of classes of the security and their respective rights, as well as 
how the security’s terms may be modified.71 The issuer must further 
disclose the identities of current shareholders who control greater than 
twenty percent of any class of the issuer’s outstanding securities as well 
as a description of how the exercise of the controlling shareholders’ 
rights could negatively impact the purchasers of the securities to be of-
fered.72 For companies not subject to the Exchange Act’s periodic re-
                                                                                                                      
64 Id. 
65 JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 302(b), § 4A(b), 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b) (2012)). 
66 Id. at sec. 302(b), § 4A(b)(1)(A)–(B). 
67 Id. at sec. 302(b), § 4A(b)(1)(C), (E)–(F). 
68 Id. at sec. 302(b), § 4A(b)(1)(D). 
69 Id. at sec. 302(b), § 4A(b)(1)(G)–(H). 
70 Id. at sec. 302(b), § 4A(b)(1)(G). 
71 JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 302(b), § 4A(b)(1)(H)(i), 126 Stat. 306 (2012) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(1)(H)(i) (2012)). 
72 Id. at sec. 302(b), § 4A(b)(1)(H)(ii)–(iii). The issuer must also disclose the risks to 
purchasers of the securities relating to minority ownership in the issuer and the risks associ-
ated with corporate actions, including additional issuances of shares, a sale of the issuer or of 
assets of the issuer, or transactions with related parties. Id. at sec. 302(b), § 4A(b)(1)(H)(v). 
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porting requirements, Title III nonetheless requires issuers to annually 
file with the SEC and report its financial status to investors.73 
 Title III further requires issuers to conduct crowdfunding offerings 
through an intermediary.74 Under Section 4(6) of the Securities Act, as 
amended by Title III, either a registered broker or a “funding portal” 
may qualify as an intermediary.75 Because funding portals are classified 
separately from brokers, the Exchange Act imposes more exacting re-
strictions on their allowable activities.76 Funding portals are not, how-
ever, required to register with the SEC as broker-dealers; instead, they 
must register with a self-regulatory organization.77 
 Bearing in mind the Securities Act’s emphasis on investor protec-
tion, Title III imposes investor understanding and education require-
ments on intermediaries.78 Before investing, investors must review edu-
cational materials prepared by the crowdfunding intermediary accord-
ing to the standards to be set forth by the SEC.79 Because of the risks 
inherent to startups and the abstract nature of securities, the interme-
diary must affirm that investors appreciate the risk of losing their entire 
investment.80 In addition to reviewing educational materials, potential 
crowdfunding investors must also answer questions pertaining to their 
 
73 Id. at sec. 302(b), § 4A(b)(4). Publicly traded companies are required to file, inter alia, 
an annual report, quarterly reports, and additional reports for material events. Form 10-K, 
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form10k.htm (last modified June 
6, 2009). The deadlines for these filings depend on the size of the filer’s “public float,” i.e., 
the amount of a company’s freely tradable public shares. Id. 
74 JOBS Act, at sec. 302(b), § 4A(a). 
75 Id. at sec. 302(b), § 4A(a)(1). The Exchange Act defines a funding portal as “any 
person acting as an intermediary in a transaction involving the offer or sale of securities 
for the account of others, solely pursuant to section 4(6).” Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80) (2012). 
76 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80)(A)–(E). Unlike brokers, funding portals may not offer in-
vestment advice or recommendations to investors nor directly solicit transactions in the 
securities offered on their websites. Similarly, funding portals may not handle investor 
funds or the issuer’s securities themselves. Id. 
77 Id. § 78c(a)(80)(h)(1)(A). Funding portals must register with a national securities 
organization registered under Section 15A of the Exchange Act, which may regulate the 
funding portal with such rules that are “written specifically for registered funding portals.” 
Id. § 78c(a)(80)(h)(1)(B). As of this time, because the only national 15A registered self-
regulatory organization is the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, all registered fund-
ing portals will be required to register with it. Thomas V. Powers, SEC Regulation of Crowd-
funding Intermediaries Under Title III of the JOBS Act, 31 Banking & Fin. Services Pol’y 
Rep. 1, 3 (2012). 
78 JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 302(b), § 4A(a)(4), 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(4) (2012)). 
79 Id. at sec. 302(b), § 4A(a)(4)(A). 
80 Id. at sec. 302(b), § 4A(a)(4)(B). 
1778 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1767 
understanding of the startup and the securities being offered.81 Finally, 
intermediaries must take measures to reduce the risk of fraud, al-
though what those measures will consist of remains subject to further 
SEC rulemaking.82 
 Despite the apparent stringency of these investor protections, Title 
III simultaneously eases restrictions on solicitation.83 Although the 
amended Section 4A(b) prohibits the issuer or others acting on its be-
half from advertising the terms of the offering, the issuer may direct 
investors to the intermediary conducting the offering.84 The issuer may 
further compensate third parties for promoting the offering “through 
communication channels provided by the intermediary,” provided the 
issuer discloses the compensation in accordance with SEC require-
ments.85 Easing the restrictions on directing potential investors to 
crowdfunding offerings allows crowdfunding issuers to leverage online 
social networks to attract sufficient investor interest that would have 
been otherwise impossible under existing regulations.86 Given the mul-
titude of online social network participants, however, online crowd-
funding offerings may attract many novice investors.87 
II. Crowdfunding and Securities Fraud 
 Federal securities laws have historically rested on two policy cor-
nerstones: (1) the requirement that issuers tell the truth about securi-
ties prior to the offering; and (2) that failure to tell the truth results in 
                                                                                                                      
81 Id. at sec. 302(b), § 4A(a)(4)(C)(i)–(iii). Investors must demonstrate that they have: 
“(i) An understanding of the level of risk generally applicable to investments in startups, 
emerging businesses, and small issuers; (ii) an understanding of the risk of illiquidity; and 
(iii) an understanding of such other matters as the Commission determines appropriate, 
by rule.” Id. 
82 Id. at sec. 302(b), § 4A(a)(5). The provision includes limited guidelines for inter-
mediary risk reduction including obtaining a background and a securities enforcement 
regulatory history check on each officer, director, and person holding more than twenty 
percent of the outstanding equity of every issuer whose securities are offered by such per-
son. Id. 
83 See id. at sec. 302(b), § 4A(b)(2). 
84 JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 302(b), § 4A(b)(2), 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(2) (2012)). 
85 Id. at sec. 302(b), § 4A(b)(3). 
86 See generally Hemingway & Hoffman, supra note 47 (noting that small businesses 
could not bear the costs imposed by existing exemptions from registration under the 
unamended Securities Act). See JOBS Act, at sec. 302(b), § 4A(b)(3) (easing restrictions on 
the solicitation of investors). 
87 Diamond, supra note 13, at 1840 (noting that by directing investors directly towards 
the offering without apprising them of the offering’s terms upfront, issuers may attract 
more unsophisticated investors). 
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a serious penalty.88 As such, adequate “front-end” protection for inves-
tors requires both that information be made available to potential in-
vestors and that investors be able to understand that information to 
make reasonable investment decisions.89 Without access to necessary 
information, investor trust in the capital markets will wane and the true 
capital formation and economic growth sought by the drafters of the 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act cannot flourish.90 
 The likelihood of issuer fraud in online crowdfunding offerings, 
however, magnifies the probability that potential investors, especially 
small unsophisticated investors, will lose all or part of their investment.91 
Fraud is endemic to the securities industry, and no exemption to regis-
tration, no matter how carefully crafted, will wholly prevent individuals 
from committing securities fraud.92 Even registration requirements, 
from which Title III exempts crowdfunding offerings, would not entirely 
protect investors from fraud.93 Nonetheless, the SEC has repeatedly 
stressed the importance, and perhaps even primacy, of investor protec-
tion over efficient capital raising through crowdfunding offerings.94 
 This Part discusses the likelihood of issuer fraud in connection 
with online crowdfunding securities offerings.95 Section A examines 
securities fraud in the Internet era and the myriad of hazards facing 
 
88 William O. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 Yale L.J. 
171, 171 (1933). 
89 Heath Abshure, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, Keynote Address at the SIMFA 
Compliance and Legal Society Annual Meeting (Mar. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Abshure Key-
note Address], available at http://www.nasaa.org/21946/nasaa-president-heath-abshures-
keynote-address-at-sifma-compliance-and-legal-society-annual-meeting/ (“It is important 
that investors understand the risk involved and . . . that investors . . . have access to infor-
mation about the issuer . . . .”); see also Manuel A. Utset, Fraudulent Corporate Signals: Con-
duct as Securities Fraud, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 645, 647 (2013) (noting how recent changes in fed-
eral securities law aim to make companies more transparent). 
90 Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Harvard Law School 
Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation: Investor Protection Is Needed 
for True Capital Formation (Mar. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Aguilar Address] (“True capital 
formation and economic growth require investors to have both confidence in the capital 
markets and access to the information needed to make good investment decisions.”). 
91 See Heath Abshure, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, Remarks at NASAA SEC 
19(d) Conference (Apr. 26, 2013) [hereinafter Abshure Remarks]. 
92 Cohn & Yadley, supra note 37, at 72 (“[N]o amount of technical exemption re-
quirements will hinder the fraud artists from their endeavors.”). 
93 Bradford, supra note 5, at 112. 
94 Aguilar Address, supra note 90 (“[The JOBS Act] would seriously hurt investors by 
reducing transparency and investor protection and, in turn, makes securities enforcement 
more difficult.”). 
95 See infra notes 98–154 and accompanying text. 
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unsuspecting investors.96 Bearing in mind that many members of the 
investing “crowd” lack financial sophistication, Section B concludes that 
the issuer disclosures required by Title III of the JOBS Act would do 
little in practice to ensure investor protection from issuer fraud.97 
A. The Prospect of Issuer Fraud in Crowdfunding Offerings 
 The impersonal nature of the Internet may increase the likelihood 
of fraud in connection with crowdfunding offerings, thus warranting 
more stringent investor protections.98 Since its creation and widespread 
popularity, the Internet has afforded securities fraudsters bountiful tar-
gets, especially by way of online social networks.99 In particular, the In-
ternet has proved highly adaptable to tried and true methods of micro-
cap securities fraud existing before the Internet.100 Spam e-mail and 
online message posting have replaced cold calling from “boiler rooms” 
as well as “pump-and-dump” schemes, offering fraudulent issuers access 
to a larger audience.101 The ease with which these schemes are perpe-
trated is inversely proportional to the amount of information available 
about the security or the issuer, making crowdfunding offerings all the 
more fertile territory for securities fraud.102 
 Unsurprisingly, unsophisticated investors are more likely to be vic-
tims of fraudulent crowdfunding offerings.103 Due to their lack of fi-
nancial acumen, these investors are ideal targets for repeated crowd-
funding frauds because they may not be able to discern legitimate 
offerings from scams or even recognize when they have been de-
frauded.104 Title III compounds this problem by failing to explicitly set 
forth how funding portals will function in practice, thus creating addi-
tional difficulty for potential investors in distinguishing between legiti-
                                                                                                                      
96 See infra notes 98–117 and accompanying text. 
97 See infra notes 118–154 and accompanying text. 
98 Hazen, supra note 4, at 1766; see Fisch, supra note 11, at 80; Internet Fraud, U.S. Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/cyberfraud.htm. 
99 Hazen, supra note 4, at 1767; see Internet Fraud, supra note 98. 
100 See Hazen, supra note 4, at 1767. “Microcap stock” refers to low price shares of small 
companies. Microcap Stock: A Guide for Investors, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n ( June 27, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/microcapstock.htm; see Hazen, supra note 4, at 1767. 
101 Hazen, supra note 4, at 1768. “Boiler rooms” are high-pressure sales operations, 
whereas “pump-and-dump” schemes entail aggressive sales or withholding of a worthless 
security from the market to boost its value before “dumping” the security into the market 
and thereby causing its value to plummet. Id. at 1767–68. 
102 Microcap Stock: A Guide for Investors, supra note 100 (“It’s easier for fraudsters to ma-
nipulate a stock when there’s little or no information about the company.”). 
103 Hazen, supra note 4, at 1766. 
104 See id. 
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mate crowdfunding offerings and scams.105 Furthermore, if unsophisti-
cated investors behave similarly to average investors—e.g., by spending 
only a fraction of their total investments on fraud detection services— 
these paltry sums will be insufficient to effectively investigate potential 
fraud, putting their investments at greater risk.106 
 A larger than average potential for fraud and self-dealing exists in 
startups than in more established companies, adding to the already high 
risk of failure inherent in startups.107 As evident from the abuse of the 
penny-stock market in the 1980s, startups make investors vulnerable to a 
disproportionate risk of fraud.108 Given the relative ease of perpetrating 
securities fraud through the Internet and online social networks, it fol-
lows that crowdfunding offerings made through online funding portals 
will breed similar abuses.109 Already, the North American Securities 
Administrators Association (“NASAA”) has placed crowdfunding securi-
ties fraud at the top of their annual investment scams list.
 Securities fraud in crowdfunding offerings may manifest itself in 
several ways.111 Fraudsters may pose as registered funding portals, a pro-
spect made more daunting by the recent spike in the number of regis-
tered domain names styling themselves as crowdfunding intermediar-
 
105 See generally JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (failing to articulate standards for the operation of funding 
portals). 
106 Nate C. Hindman, Post-JOBS Act, Investors Brace for Startup Scam Artists, Huffington 
Post, (Apr. 18, 2012, 11:31 AM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/18/jobs-act-
2012-fraud-investors-scam_n_1432842.html. Investors on average spend a mere 0.1 percent 
of their total investment on fraud detection services. Id. Applying this average to Title III’s 
$2000 investment limitation, a small investor is only likely to spend two dollars on average 
investigating the offered securities prior to purchase assuming the investor spends the 
maximum amount. Id. 
107 Bradford, supra note 5, at 105. 
108 Id. 
109 See Karen E. Klein, Crowdfunding Sites Launch a Preemptive Strike on Fraud, Bloom-
berg Businessweek, Apr. 9, 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-04-09/ 
crowdfunding-sites-launch-a-preemptive-strike-on-fraud. According to a former general coun-
sel for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) Congressional Oversight Panel, there is 
“‘concern that scammers will descend on the fledgling market and mire it in fraud.’” Id. In 
addition, “‘There will be unregistered people cropping up [to offer small business equity 
investments] and the SEC will spend a lot of time shutting them down.’” Id. (alteration in 
original). 
110 Beth Pinsker Gladstone, Crowdfunding Scams Top Investor Threat: Regulators, Reuters, 
Aug. 21, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/21/us-investing-scams- 
threats-idUSBRE87K17W20120821. Founded in 1919, NASAA is an investor protection asso-
ciation of sixty-seven securities regulators from the territories, districts, and states of the 
United States, Mexico, and Canada. See Our Role, N. Am. Sec. Admins. Ass’n, http://www. 
nasaa.org/about-us/our-role/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2013). 
111 Taku, supra note 10, at 4. 
1782 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1767 
ies.112 Alternatively, fraudsters may directly solicit unwitting investors 
with fraudulent crowdfunding offerings through a legitimate funding 
portal by way of spam e-mail, message board postings, and social media 
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter.113 
 Although the SEC has not completed rules governing equity-based 
crowdfunding offerings, frauds have already been exposed in connec-
tion with donation-based crowdfunding.114 For example, one crowd-
funding website, Gittip.com—which connects charitable endeavors to 
potential donors—discovered that the website’s platform was being 
used to launder money from stolen credit cards.115 In addition, in Au-
gust of 2012, the Massachusetts Securities Division formally charged a 
Lowell resident for defrauding twenty investors of $153,396 in connec-
tion with a crowdfunding scam involving a gaming website.116 The ease 
with which donors are defrauded of their simple donations demon-
strates the ease with which unsophisticated investors could be de-
frauded through vastly more complex equity securities.117 
                                                                                                                      
112 Eileen Ambrose, New Law Allows Entrepreneurs to Sell Securities via Crowdfunding: Con-
sumer Advocates Fear Crowdfleecing, Balt. Sun (Apr. 14, 2012, 7:45 PM), http://www.baltimore 
sun.com/business/money/bs-bz-ambrose-crowdfunding-20120414,0,6798661.story?page=1 
(“No question, fraud will occur. If con artists can send you emails that look as if they come 
from your bank, they will be able to set up counterfeit sites that appear to belong to authen-
tic groups raising capital.”). Another commentator has suggested: 
“The number of entities already out there pitching themselves as crowdfund-
ing entities online has risen in a significant fashion . . . . Just look at the web 
domain names: it has gone from a couple hundred to well over 1,600 in the 
past year. They are staking a position to enter [the] crowdfunding market. 
There will be a lot more to come on this.” 
Gladstone, supra note 110 (quoting NASAA Enforcement Section Chair Matt Kitzi). 
113 See Taku, supra note 10, at 4; Internet Fraud, supra note 98. 
114 See Darren Pauli, Fraudsters Launder Cash Through Grants Startup, Secure Bus. In-
telligence (Nov. 7, 2012, 8:42 AM), http://www.scmagazine.com.au/News/322118, 
fraudsters-launder-cash-though-grants-startup.aspx. 
115 See id. 
116 See generally Administrative Complaint, In re Tabletop Arena, No. 2012-0022 (Mass. Sec. 
Div. Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/current/sctcrowdfunding/crowdfunding_ 
Complaint.pdf (describing a “crowdfunding” scheme in which defendants offered $250,000 
worth of securities through social media websites such as Facebook and Twitter after default-
ing on previous notes). 
117 See Letter from William F. Galvin, Sec’y of the Commonwealth of Mass., to Elizabeth 
M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 8, 2012). (“[C]rowdfunding may also 
serve as a new channel that fraud promoters can use to distribute penny stocks widely to 
the public. Such promoters could later manipulate the stocks if they begin to trade in an 
over-the-counter market.”). 
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B. The Implications of Online Crowdfunding Offerings for Small 
Unsophisticated Investors 
 Given federal securities laws’ underlying concern with telling the 
truth about securities, meaningful investor protection must arise from 
adequate information about crowdfunding issuers and their securities, 
as well as the investor’s ability to understand that information.118  Al-
though no amount of regulation can completely eliminate the invest-
ment risks present in any securities offering, Title III of the JOBS Act 
may not provide meaningful safeguards for unsophisticated investors in 
crowdfunding offerings.119 Crowdfunding investors may not be able to 
protect themselves by choosing not to purchase a startup’s securities 
because many of them may lack the necessary financial acumen or in-
formation about the startup to make that choice.120 
 Investors may be further ensnared by the fact that many startups 
seeking to take advantage of crowdfunding offerings will not under-
stand the difference between lawfully promoting their products online 
and priming the market for their securities in violation of Title III.121 As 
a threshold matter, Title III allows crowdfunding securities issuers to 
lead investors to the funding portal or broker.122 By directing potential 
investors directly towards the offering without apprising them of the 
offering’s terms upfront, issuers may attract more unsophisticated in-
vestors.123 The issuer may, and will have to, provide notice to prospec-
tive investors directing them to the issuer’s funding portal or interme-
diary.124 The Act fails, however, to define what constitutes “notice” or to 
provide any examples for prospective issuers.125 Although Title III pur-
 
118 Abshure Keynote Address, supra note 89 (“It is important that investors understand 
the risk involved and . . . that investors . . . have access to information about the issuer 
. . . .”). 
119 See Bradford, supra note 5, at 112. Compare JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 
302(b), § 4A(b), 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b) (2012)) (imposing 
disclosure requirements on issuers), with Hazen supra note 9, § 1.2 (indicating that many 
investors will likely lack the financial acumen to understand their investments). 
120 See Hazen supra note 9, § 1.2. 
121 Thaya Brook Knight et al., A Very Quiet Revolution: A Primer on Securities Crowdfunding 
and Title III of the JOBS Act, 2 Mich. J. Private Equity & Venture Cap. L. 135, 141–42 
(2012). 
122 JOBS Act, at sec. 302(b), § 4A(b)(2) (indicating that issuers may “not advertise the 
terms of [an] offering, except for notices which direct investors to [a] funding portal or 
broker”). 
123 Diamond, supra note 13, at 1838–39. 
124 JOBS Act, at sec. 302(b), § 4A(b)(2). 
125 See generally id. (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (failing to provide guid-
ance on the issue of “notice”). 
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ports to forbid issuers from advertising the terms of the offering, the 
distinction between “notice” and “advertising” means little to startups 
that may engage in advertising and cast a wider net ensnaring unso-
phisticated investors.126 
 Although Title III directly addresses the issue of investor education 
and financial acumen by delegating responsibilities to funding portals, 
these demands may not adequately protect small unsophisticated inves-
tors.127 Under Title III, funding portals must provide potential investors 
with educational materials and disclosures related to the security being 
offered.128 Additionally, funding portals must ensure investors read the 
aforementioned material, understand the nature of the investment (and 
the possibility of losing all or part of the investment), and demonstrate 
their knowledge pertaining to the risks associated with the invest-
ment.129 Thus far, the SEC has offered scant guidance on how funding 
portals will operate.130 Providing the requisite disclosures to investors 
will require funding portals to undertake their own due diligence, which 
may in turn require the assistance of legal counsel at considerable ex-
                                                                                                                      
126 See Diamond, supra note 13, at 1840. According to the President of NASAA, under 
the JOBS Act, “We’re opening the door to broad solicitation and advertising of these 
[small securities offerings].” Id. As a result, he predicts that “[t]he lies are going to be easy 
to disseminate.” Id. 
127 See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 302(b), § 4A(a)(3)–(4), 126 Stat. 306 (2012) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(3)–(4) (2012)); see also Cohn, supra note 44, at 1441 
(questioning the willingness of funding portals to undertake their investor education obli-
gations). 
128 Id. at sec. 302(b), § 4A(a)(3) (indicating that funding portals must “provide such 
disclosures, including disclosures related to risks and other investor education materials, as 
the Commission shall, by rule, determine appropriate”). 
129 JOBS Act, at sec. 302(b), § 4A(a)(4). The JOBS Act requires funding portals to 
(4) ensure that each investor 
(A) reviews investor-education information, in accordance with standards es-
tablished by the Commission, by rule; 
(B) positively affirms that the investor understands that the investor is risking 
the loss of the entire investment, and that the investor could bear such a loss; 
and 
(C) answers questions demonstrating— 
 (i) an understanding of the level of risk generally applicable to invest-
ments in startups, emerging businesses, and small issuers; 
 (ii) an understanding of the risk of illiquidity; 
 (iii) an understanding of such other matters as the Commission deter-
mines appropriate, by rule . . . . 
Id.; see supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text (reviewing the responsibilities and obliga-
tions of both funding portals and investors with regard to ensuring investor competency). 
130 Powers, supra note 77, at 3. 
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pense.131 Furthermore, it is unclear how funding portals would ensure 
that potential unsophisticated investors have understood the nature of 
their investment.132 Although the required educational material will like-
ly not make unsophisticated investors sophisticated, merely alerting po-
tential investors that some risk exists is insufficient.133 
 The relative lack of financial understanding held by unsophisti-
cated investors creates a greater need for increased investor protec-
tion.134 Although federal securities laws are predicated on the full and 
fair disclosure of information, unsophisticated investors, who by defini-
tion have a limited grasp on finance, will not be able to use the infor-
mation to make meaningful investment decisions.135 Members of the 
so-called “crowd” generally have limited understanding of basic fi-
nance, much less capital markets and investing.136 A 2010 financial lit-
eracy study prepared for the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission noted 
a marked disconnect between the average individual’s perception of 
their financial and mathematical knowledge and their responses to 
questions measuring financial and mathematical comprehension.137 
For example, although thirty-eight percent of respondents rated their 
own financial knowledge as “very high,” fewer than ten percent of re-
spondents answered each question correctly.138 Furthermore, forty-two 
percent of the respondents who described themselves as very risk averse 
incorrectly answered a question about risk and diversification— con-
cepts that these types of investors should presumably know about.139 If 
such a large percentage of the “crowd” lacks even basic knowledge of 
general financial principles, these potential investors will not likely ap-
preciate the complicated statements released in connection with a 
crowdfunding offering.140 
 Even assuming that potential crowdfunding investors understood 
the information provided by the issuer, it would be challenging for any 
investor to evaluate and verify the quality of that information, regard-
 
131 Id. at 4. 
132 See Bradford, supra note 5, at 139 (suggesting that funding portals educate investors 
by way of a short instructional video, but conceding that there is no simple means to en-
sure that investors actually watch these videos); see also JOBS Act, at sec. 302(b), § 4A(a)(4) 
(mandating that funding portals ensure investor competency). 
133 Bradford, supra note 5, at 138. 
134 Bradford, supra note 12, at 2. 
135 See Hazen, supra note 9, § 1.2. 
136 Bradford, supra note 5, at 112. 
137 Annamaria Lusardi, Americans’ Financial Capability 15 (2010). 
138 Id. 
139 See id. at 16. 
140 See Bradford, supra note 5, at 112. 
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less of competency.141 Unlike large public companies, whose periodic 
SEC reports are scrutinized by professional analysts, small startups pos-
sess limited hard information.142 New startups are unlikely to have gen-
erated enough business to provide sufficient information for potential 
investors to make a meaningful investment decision, a problem known 
as “information asymmetry.”143 The balance of information about the 
business startup weighs heavily in favor of the entrepreneur, preventing 
investors from discerning promising investments from busts.144 
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the risk of failure inherent 
to business startups is substantially greater than that of established 
companies, which ultimately translates into a more hazardous invest-
ment.145 Small business startups lack the larger capitalization of more 
established companies and are thus less likely to survive downturns, 
competition, and other market pressures.146  In addition, the majority of 
critical business decisions that will ultimately determine the startup’s 
success or failure have yet to be made at the time of funding.147 Despite 
elaborate business plans, most startups lack a proven track record of 
success.148 Nearly eighty percent of business startups fail within five to 
seven years of formation typically because of insufficient managerial 
                                                                                                                      
141 Fisch, supra note 11, at 78; see also Statement of Sen. Levin, supra note 7 (expressing 
concern that without sufficient investor protection in the form of meaningful disclosure, 
investors may not be able to discern legitimate crowdfunding offerings from frauds). 
142 Taku, supra note 10, at 3. One commentator has noted: 
As a practical matter, many early-stage startup companies that are considering 
crowdfunding may have only been recently incorporated and have not yet 
filed tax returns. Furthermore, many startup companies may not yet have en-
gaged independent public accountants, nor have audited financial statements 
at the time they wish to raise funds. 
Id. 
143 See Fisch, supra note 11, at 78 (noting that informational asymmetries make it diffi-
cult for small businesses to raise capital); see also Ilan L. Moscowivitz & John Maxfield, 
Sumbitted Commentary on JOBS Act Title III 1 ( June 27, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-98.pdf (“[T]he opportunities for misuse and abuse are 
enormous dues to the inherently speculative nature of start-ups, as well as what will cer-
tainly be weaker accounting scrutiny and corporate governance.”). 
144 Cable, supra note 21, at 122. 
145 Bradford, supra note 5, at 105. 
146 See Fisch, supra note 11, at 60 (noting that the primary cause of startup failure, after 
management mistakes, is insufficient capitalization). 
147 Cable, supra note 21, at 122. 
148 Bradford, supra note 5, at 106; see also Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital 
Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1067, 1076–77 (2003) (“Virtu-
ally all of the important decisions bearing on the company’s success remain to be made, 
and most of the significant uncertainties concerning the outcome of the company’s efforts 
remain unresolved.”). 
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tion.154 
III. Sm cally 
crowdfunding issuers, this remedy may provide little comfort to small 
                                                                                                                     
experience, limited access to capital, or an unwanted product or ser-
vice.149 This tendency towards quick collapse makes an already unat-
tractive investment opportunity even more treacherous to first time and 
unsophisticated startup investors.150 
 Even though crowdfunding fills a necessary funding gap for start-
ups seeking needed capital, Title III creates a host of fresh concerns for 
small unsophisticated investors.151 Given the lack of financial acumen 
for small investors and the corresponding inadequacies of Title III’s dis-
closure requirements, issuer fraud in connection with online crowd-
funding offerings is likely.152 Even without adequate “front-end” protec-
tion at the time of the initial purchase, however, crowdfunding investors 
retain a private right of action against an issuer on the “back-end” in the 
event of securities fraud under Title III.153 Nonetheless, the landscape of 
federal securities regulation may effectively eviscerate small investors’ 
ability to seek adequate redress under Title III’s private righ
all Crowdfunding Investors Lack an Economi
Viable Form of Redress for Securities Fraud 
 Although Title III of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) 
Act provides defrauded investors with a private right of action against 
 
149 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO/GGD-00-190, Small Business: Efforts 
to Facilitate Equity Capital Formation 19 (2000). 
150 See Bradford, supra note 5, at 105. 
151 See Cohn, supra note 44, at 1438. 
152 See Daniel Isenberg, Submitted Commentary on JOBS Act Title III 1 (Apr. 15, 
2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-70.pdf (noting that equity 
investors in crowdfunding ventures will suffer because they “simply cannot know enough 
about the highly risky ventures or the highly complex venture investing process to make 
informed investment decisions”). 
153 Abshure Keynote Address, supra note 89. According to the President of NASAA: 
If efforts to promote access to investment capital for small businesses are to 
be successful, investors need to be confident that they are reasonably pro-
tected from fraud and undisclosed risk. This means that investors must have 
access to information about the issuer and, where there is wrongdoing, ade-
quate civil recourse. 
Id. 
154 Diamond, supra note 13, at 1840 (arguing that class action lawsuits are the only vi-
able means for small investors to seek redress for crowdfunding fraud and expressing con-
cern that existing federal legislation may impede upon investors’ ability to sue crowdfund-
ing issuers as a class). 
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unsophisticated investors.155 Given that small investors may only pur-
chase crowdfunding securities in limited amounts, and that Title III’s 
private right of action limits defrauded investors to recovering only the 
amount invested, the cost of bringing an individual action would inevi-
tably exceed the benefits provided by a successful verdict.156 As such, 
the economic utility of Title III’s private right of action virtually re-
quires small unsophisticated investors to join together in a class action 
lawsuit.157 
 Plaintiffs having purchased securities from a crowdfunding offering 
are entitled to bring an action under § 77d-1(c) of the Securities Act of 
1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”) in the event of issuer fraud.158 
Title III’s private right of action is unique insofar as plaintiffs need not 
prove that the alleged fraud caused their loss, as is required by the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the “PSLRA”).159 Instead, 
section 77d-1(c) shifts the burden of proving loss causation to the de-
fendant by incorporating by reference § 77l(b) of the Securities Act.160  
According to § 77l(b), the defendant may avoid liability by proving that 
the security depreciated in value for a reason distinct from the alleged 
fraud.161 Title III’s evidentiary burden is also distinguishable from the 
PSLRA because it does not require plaintiffs to prove that defendants 
                                                                                                                      
155 See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 302(b), § 4A(c)(2)(A), 126 Stat. 306 (2012) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(2)(A) (2012)); Abshure Keynote Address, supra note 89 
(noting that the lack of civil recovery options for victims of securities fraud presents par-
ticular risks to small crowdfunding investors). 
156 Abshure Remarks, supra note 91 (“The losses in single instances of fraud are unlike-
ly to be sufficient to support a private legal action by a single victim.”). 
157 See id. 
158 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(2)(A) (2012). The new liability provi-
sion levies penalties on issuers for false or misleading statements if the issuer: 
[B]y any means of any written or oral communication, in the offering or sale 
of any security in a transaction exempted by the provisions of section 77d(6) 
of this title, makes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a 
material fact required to be stated or necessary in order to make the statements, 
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
159 Bradford, supra note 12, at 13. Compare JOBS Act, sec. 302(b), § 4A(c)(1)(B) (pro-
viding a private right of action that does not require plaintiffs to prove that an alleged 
fraud caused their loss), with Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2012) (“In any private action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff 
shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission of the defendant alleged to vio-
late this chapter caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”). 
160 Bradford, supra note 12, at 13; see Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d-
1(c)(1)(B). 
161 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77l(b); see Bradford, supra note 12, at 13. 
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acted with scienter.162 Defendants may, however, avoid liability by show-
ing that they “did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could 
not have known, of such untruth or omission.”163 
 Despite the private right of action provided for in Title III, a po-
tential roadblock may exist for defrauded investors seeking to bring a 
class action lawsuit against a crowdfunding issuer.164 The PSLRA, which 
erects procedural hurdles for plaintiff classes alleging securities fraud, 
would effectively void the efficacy of Title III’s private right of action.165 
The PSLRA requires plaintiffs to plead scienter as well as loss causation 
with particularity, a daunting prospect given the scant information that 
will be available about most startups.166 Thus, small unsophisticated 
investors seeking redress for securities fraud in connection with crowd-
funding offerings may lack viable recourse by way of Title III’s private 
right of action.167 
 Given the risks associated with crowdfunding offerings, this Part 
examines whether the private right of action in Title III of the JOBS Act 
affords defrauded small crowdfunding investors adequate redress.168 
Section A suggests that Title III’s private right of action would, as a 
practical matter, require small defrauded investors to sue a crowdfund-
ing issuer as a class.169 Section B argues that, despite the necessity of the 
class action vehicle, the procedural impediments of the PSLRA will like-
ly frustrate the efforts of small investors seeking redress for securities 
fraud under Title III’s private right of action.170 
 
162 Compare JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 302(b), § 4A(c), 126 Stat. 306 (2012) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c) (2012)) (imposing no requirement that plaintiffs prove 
defendants acted with scienter), with PSLRA § 78u-4(b)(2) (imposing this requirement on 
plaintiffs). 
163 JOBS Act, at sec. 302(b), § 4A(c)(2)(B). Because the same language appears in 
§ 77l(a)(2) of the Securities Act, it is fair to assume that courts will interpret the language 
of Title III in the same way—denying recovery to plaintiffs who were aware of the mis-
statement or omission. Bradford, supra note 12, at 13; see 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2). 
164 Diamond, supra note 13, at 1839–40 (illustrating the fears of Heath Abshure, Presi-
dent of NASAA, that existing federal legislation such as the PSLRA may effectively pre-
clude defrauded investors from suing an issuer as a class). 
165 See id.; see also Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-4(b) (2012) (imposing heightened burdens on class action securities fraud suits). 
166 See PSLRA § 78u-4(b)(2)(A), (b)(4); Taku, supra note 10, at 3 (noting that most 
startups seeking to take advantage of crowdfunding may have just recently incorporated 
and have yet to file tax returns or engage professional auditors, all of which limit the in-
formation available about the startup to investors). 
167 See Diamond, supra note 13, at 1840. 
168 See infra notes 171–216 and accompanying text. 
169 See infra notes 171–181 and accompanying text. 
170 See infra notes 182–216 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Economic Utility of Title III’s Private Right of Action for Small 
Unsophisticated Investors 
 The difficulties present in Title III’s private right of action with re-
spect to investor redress for securities fraud would bear most heavily on 
small investors because they have the most to lose.171 Although Title III’s 
limitations on investments minimize the exposure of potential small in-
vestors to bad investments, this cap on spending may preclude small in-
vestors from successfully recouping their losses in the event of issuer 
fraud.172 Title III allows small investors to invest up to $2000 per year in 
crowdfunding offerings, an amount that exceeds what many individuals 
can bear to lose in the event of issuer fraud.173 A troubling prospect for 
small investors is the fact that legal fees to bring an action against the 
issuer would inevitably exceed the $2000 maximum investment.174 An 
individual plaintiff who can only afford to invest $2000 will likely be un-
able to afford to retain an attorney.175 Representation on contingency is 
similarly unlikely as the damages are limited by the small size of the ini-
tial investment and thus inadequate to compel representation.176 
 Because of the economic disadvantages that individual small inves-
tors face in bringing a securities fraud action against a crowdfunding 
issuer, a class action lawsuit presents the only feasible remedy.177 Follow-
ing the filing of a class action lawsuit, a federal court decides whether to 
certify the suit in accordance with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.178 The PSLRA requires the court to approve a “Lead Plain-
                                                                                                                      
171 Abshure Remarks, supra note 91 (noting that a class action lawsuit is a virtual pre-
requisite for small, defrauded investors because the JOBS Act limits the amount of money 
an individual small investor may invest, and a single instance of fraud may affect dozens of 
similarly situated investors). 
172 See id. 
173 See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 302(a), § 4(a)(6), 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (cod-
ified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012)); Bradford, supra note 12, at 18. 
174 See Abshure Keynote Address, supra note 89 (“The losses in instances of fraud are 
unlikely to be sufficient to support a private legal action by a single [fraud] victim.”). 
175 See Lyndon M. Tretter, Commentary, Crowdfunding: Small Business Incubator or Securi-
ties Fraud Accelerator, Reuters, Aug. 22, 2012, available at 18 No. 8 WJSLR 1. 
176 Id.; see JOBS Act, sec. 302(b), § 4A(c)(1) (limiting plaintiff’s recovery to “the con-
sideration paid for such security with interest thereon,” in the event of issuer fraud); Ha-
zen, supra note 4, at 1759; see also Diamond, supra note 13, at 1840 (“‘An investor in that 
offering, acting individually, is never going to find an attorney,’ Abshure continued. ‘It’s 
$1,000. Which attorney is going to take a securities fraud case with the chance to win $330? 
It’s got to be a class action . . . .’”). 
177 See Diamond, supra note 13, at 1840. 
178 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
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tiff” or “Co-Lead Plaintiffs” to represent the class’s interests.179 Class 
actions allow individuals to aggregate their otherwise paltry claims into 
a larger judgment, making the suit economically advantageous to 
bring.180 As a result, class actions are especially popular in the securities 
litigation arena.181 
B. The PSLRA Will Bar Classes of Small Unsophisticated Investors from Suing 
Under Title III’s Private Right of Action 
 Before bringing a class action lawsuit alleging securities fraud 
against a crowdfunding issuer, plaintiff classes must consider whether 
other federal securities regulations impede such a suit.182 The PSLRA, 
enacted in 1995, imposes heightened pleading requirements on plain-
tiff classes alleging securities fraud.183  Plaintiffs must first specify the 
issuer’s particular misleading statements or omissions as well as sup-
porting reasons.184 When basing their allegations on information and 
belief, plaintiffs must furthermore state “with particularity all facts on 
which that belief is formed.”185 Finally, plaintiffs must allege scienter, 
stating “with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the 
defendant acted with the required state of mind.”186 If plaintiffs fail to 
meet PSLRA’s pleadings requirements, defendants can move to dismiss 
the action during which time discovery is stayed.187 Because of this 
heightened pleading standard, the PSLRA might have the effect of 
precluding class action lawsuits brought under Title III.188 
 
179 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(a)(3) (2012). 
180 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru 
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 388, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)) (“The policy at the very core of the class 
action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the 
incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.”). 
181 Press Release, Cornerstone Research, Despite Record Low Number of Settlements 
in 2012, Securities Class Action Settlements Increase from 2011 (Mar. 20, 2013) (noting 
that the average reported settlement of a class action suit increased in excess of 150% from 
$21.6 million in 2011 to $54.7 million in 2012). 
182 See Abshure Remarks, supra note 91. 
183Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) 
(2012). 
184 Id. § 78u-4(b)(1). 
185 Id. 
186 Id. § 78u-4(b)(2). 
187 Id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A)–(B). 
188 See Diamond, supra note 13, at 1839–40. 
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1. The PSLRA and the Problem of “Strike Suits” 
 Congress enacted the PSLRA in order to rein in the apparent ex-
ploitation of private class actions alleging securities fraud.189 Despite 
the class action lawsuit’s utility in the realm of securities fraud litigation 
for groups of small investors, several unintended consequences arose 
from the use of the class action vehicle for more nefarious purposes.190 
Chief among these was the “strike suit,” a meritless action filed for the 
sole purpose of extorting a settlement from a defendant issuer.191 Be-
cause the possibility of having to pay an exorbitant judgment is likely in 
cases of securities fraud, defendant issuers often choose to settle rather 
than risk going to trial.192 The coercive pressure facing issuers to settle 
strike suits consequently creates a perverse incentive for plaintiffs’ at-
torneys to bring vexatious litigation in response to any dip in the is-
suer’s stock price, regardless of culpability.193 Even with issuers happy to 
settle with plaintiff’s attorneys, neither have a strong incentive to pro-
tect the actual plaintiffs forming the class.194 
 Congress enacted the PSLRA as a means of discouraging abusive 
and often meritless class action lawsuits alleging securities fraud against 
technology issuers.195 In doing so, Congress sought to effectuate several 
goals: to reduce the external costs of non-meritorious suits on capital 
markets, to reduce litigation risk for technology companies dispropor-
tionately targeted by strike-suits, and to avoid suits filed on the basis of 
the issuer’s stock depreciating without any pre-filing investigation of 
                                                                                                                      
189 See generally John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. Law. 335 (1996) (discussing the 
policy considerations informing the passage of the PSLRA). 
190 Neil M. Gorsuch & Paul B. Matey, Commentary, Settlements In Securities Fraud Class 
Actions: Improving Investor Protection, Andrews Corp. Off. & Directors Liab. Litig. Rep., 
July 25, 2005, at 1. 
191 H.R. Rep. No. 105-803, at 13 (1998) (Conf. Rep.). “Strike suits” are actions de-
signed to “extract a sizable settlement from companies that are forced to settle, regardless 
of the lack of merits of the suit, simply to avoid the potentially bankrupting expense of 
litigation.” Id. 
192 Gorsuch & Matey, supra note 190, at 2 (quoting In Re Rhone-Pulec Roer, Inc., 51 
F.3d 1293, 1294 (7th Cir. 1995)) (noting that between “stak[ing] their companies on the 
outcome of a single jury trial, or be[ing] forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy [into 
settling] even if they have no legal liability,” companies accused of securities fraud prefer 
the latter course). 
193 114 Cong. Rec. E1384-85 ( July 22, 1998) (statement of Rep. John Boehner) (“If the 
stock went down, even briefly, the trial lawyers sued the companies and harassed them.”). 
194 Gorsuch & Matey, supra note 190, at 3. 
195 H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). 
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underlying fraud.196 The PSLRA seeks to curb strike suits by heighten-
ing the standards as to what constitutes securities fraud, giving plaintiffs 
more control over their attorneys, and compelling judges to impose 
mandatory sanctions on attorneys for filing vexatious claims.197 
2. The PSLRA’s Procedural Hurdles Applied to Crowdfunding 
 Given that the PSLRA covers private class action lawsuits alleging 
securities fraud, classes of small investors will have substantial obstacles 
to clear.198 Heath Abshure, President of the North American Securities 
Administrators Association (“NASAA”), echoed this sentiment, express-
ing concerns that the PSLRA’s pleading restrictions could impede in-
vestors seeking redress for crowdfunding securities fraud.199 The 
PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirements could effectively eliminate 
plaintiffs’ already limited remedies under Title III’s private right of ac-
tion, precluding small investors from recouping their lost investments 
and creating “litigation-proof” offerings.200 
 The PSLRA requires plaintiff classes to show the defendant issuer’s 
state of mind.201 This concept, known as “scienter,” refers to the defen-
dant’s requisite mental state indicating intent to deceive, manipulate, 
or defraud.202 The burden of showing the defendant crowdfunding 
issuer’s mental state is, however, conspicuously absent from Title III’s 
private right of action.203 
 Plaintiff classes would have difficulty meeting the PSLRA’s scienter 
requirement, especially in cases where the defendant issuer allegedly 
acted recklessly.204 The PSLRA increases the standard of proving de-
fendant’s state of mind under FRCP 9(b), requiring plaintiffs to “state 
 
196 Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. Ill. 
L. Rev. 913, 915. 
197 Stephen T. Choi & Robert B. Thomson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes 
During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1489, 1489 (2006); see Private Secu-
rities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A), (b)(4) (2012). 
198 See id. One commentator suggests otherwise. See Hazen, supra note 4, at 1758 (“[A] 
class action involving securities that are not widely publicly traded may not be subject to 
the heightened pleading standards of the [PSLRA].”). 
199 See Diamond, supra note 13, at 1839–40. 
200 See id. 
201 PSLRA § 78u-4(b)(2)(A). 
202 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). 
203 See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 302(b), § 4A(c)(2)(B), 126 Stat. 306 (2012) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(2)(B) (2012)). 
204 See Knight et al., supra note 121, at 141–42. 
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with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference” of scienter.205 The 
“strong inference” language precludes plaintiffs from merely inferring 
the misstatement and intent elements of a claim.206 Scienter includes 
instances of reckless conduct—extreme departures from the standards 
of ordinary care.207 Take for example the likelihood that crowdfunding 
issuers may inadvertently prime the market through advertising the 
terms of the offering as prohibited by Title III.208 Unwary investors who 
purchase securities from the offering may be frustrated later on in their 
attempt to sue the issuer as a class because of the difficulty in showing 
that, prior to discovery, the defendant issuer’s conduct rose to the level 
of recklessness.209 
 Additionally, the PSLRA requires plaintiff classes to prove that the 
defendant issuer caused plaintiff’s loss prior to undertaking discov-
ery.210 Although Title III shifts the burden of proving loss causation to 
the defendant, the PSLRA denies plaintiff this convenience.211 The 
United States Supreme Court recently increased the plaintiff’s burden 
to prove loss causation in 2005, holding in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Broudo that a plaintiff class may not meet the PSLRA’s loss causation 
burden solely by pleading that they purchased a security at a price in-
flated by an issuer’s misrepresentations.212 
 Reading the PSLRA to hold plaintiff classes to a higher evidentiary 
standard, however, puts the cart before the horse because of the scant 
                                                                                                                      
205 Compare Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b)(2)(A) (2012) (“[T]he complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to 
violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the 
defendant acted with the required state of mind.”), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (“In alleging 
fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud 
or mistake.”). 
206 PSLRA § 78u-4(b)(2)(A). In the 2007 United States Supreme Court case Tellabs, 
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., the Court decided that a “strong inference” must be “co-
gent” and “at least as compelling as an opposing inference on non-fraudulent intent.” 551 
U.S. 308, 324 (2007). 
207 Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977) (noting 
that reckless conduct is that which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is 
either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it). 
208 Knight et al., supra note 121, at 141–42. 
209 See id. 
210 PSLRA § 78u-4(b)(4). 
211 Compare JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 302(b), § 4A(c)(2)(B), 126 Stat. 306 
(2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(2)(B) (2012)) (requiring the defendant to dis-
prove loss causation), with Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, 
§ 78u-4(b)(4) (2012) (“In any private action arising under this chapter, plaintiff shall have 
the burden of proving that the act or omission of the defendant alleged to violate this 
chapter caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”). 
212 See 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005). 
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information available concerning the issuer.213 In contrast to large pub-
licly traded companies, against whom strike-suits are typically filed, 
startups are unlikely to have generated enough business to provide suf-
ficient information upon which to make meaningful investment deci-
sions.214 Without such information from defendant issuer’s disclosures, 
plaintiff classes would be hard-pressed to plead loss causation with par-
ticularity prior to discovery.215 As such, small investors suing as a class 
may face unique challenges in recouping their losses in the event of 
issuer fraud.216 
IV. A Workable Crowdfunding Exemption Must Allow Small 
Investors to Seek Redress for Securities Fraud 
 An exception to the heightened pleading requirements of the 
Private Securities Litigation Class Action Reform Act of 1995 (the 
“PSLRA”) should be made for investors that sue crowdfunding issuers 
for securities fraud as a class.217 Without an exception, classes of small 
crowdfunding investors will face substantial difficulties in curbing issuer 
fraud, and future investors may be reluctant to purchase crowdfunding 
securities.218 In addition, none of the policy goals underlying the 
PSLRA would be served were the statute used to preclude classes of de-
frauded small investors from bringing suit against a crowdfunding is-
suer.219 Applying the PSLRA to bar crowdfunding class actions would 
run counter to the second of the two primary goals of the landscape of 
federal securities laws: that failure to tell the truth results in a serious 
penalty for issuers.220 Title III of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups 
 
213 See Taku, supra note 10, at 3 (noting that most early-stage business startups have not 
yet filed tax returns or engaged independent public accountants to create audited finan-
cial statements). 
214 See id. 
215 See PSLRA § 78u-4(b)(1) (requiring plaintiff to “state with particularity facts giving 
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind”); Ab-
shure Keynote Address, supra note 89 (noting that the riskiest startups typically lack a 
proven business track record). 
216 Abshure Remarks, supra note 91. 
217 See infra notes 218–258 and accompanying text. 
218 See Diamond, supra note 13, at 1840; see also Aguilar Address, supra note 90 (noting 
that confidence in U.S. capital markets perpetuates and sustains the growth of those mar-
kets). 
219 Diamond, supra note 13, at 1840 (providing the president of the NASAA’s observa-
tions that class action lawsuits brought by small crowdfunding investors are not likely to be 
strike suits designed to shake out settlements from issuers that the PSLRA was designed to 
protect); see Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 
(2012). 
220 Douglas & Bates, supra note 88, at 171. 
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(“JOBS”) Act unequivocally affords that right to defrauded investors— 
and there it should remain.221 
 To serve as an effective crowdfunding exemption, Title III of the 
JOBS Act must simultaneously allow startups easier access to capital 
markets and protect investors from fraudulent offerings.222 Small un-
sophisticated investors merit the most stringent protections because 
they have the most to lose.223 Although Title III’s private right of action 
offers classes of crowdfunding investors the ability to recoup their losses 
in the event of fraud, the heightened pleading standards contained in 
the PSLRA would irreparably hamstring plaintiff classes.224 
 In this Part, Section A argues that the PSLRA should not preclude 
small defrauded investors from suing crowdfunding issuers as a class in 
instances of fraud because such lawsuits would not implicate the poli-
cies underlying PSLRA.225 Section B suggests that any change in the law 
must come from Congress and proposes that Congress carve out an 
exception for crowdfunding offerings in the PSLRA itself.226 
A. The Public Policies Underlying the PSLRA Cut Against Preclusion of Class 
Action Lawsuits Brought by Small Investors 
 In passing the PSLRA, one of Congress’s chief goals was to prevent 
class action securities fraud suits from targeting deep-pocketed defen-
dants without regard to actual culpability.227 This scenario, however, is 
highly improbable with respect to crowdfunding offerings because of 
the limited capital held by most startups.228 Small startups seeking capi-
tal through crowdfunding offerings lack the larger capitalization of 
                                                                                                                      
221 See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 302(b), § 4A(c)(2)(A), 126 Stat. 306 (2012) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(2)(A) (2012)); Abshure Keynote Address, supra note 89 
(illustrating that the heightened requirements of the PLSRA effectively vitiate the private 
right of action provided by Title III, causing crowdfunding investors to be without mean-
ingful recourse in the event of securities fraud). 
222 See Aguilar Address, supra note 90 (“True capital formation and economic growth 
require investors to have both confidence in the capital markets and access to the informa-
tion needed to make good investment decisions.”). 
223 See Abshure Remarks, supra note 91 (acknowledging that increasing procedural and 
evidentiary burdens on investor class actions in the era of crowdfunding “presents a par-
ticular risk to small investors”). 
224 See Abshure Keynote Address, supra note 89 (arguing that heightened procedural 
and evidentiary burdens will have particularly profound effects on small investors in the 
crowdfunding era). 
225 See infra notes 227–241 and accompanying text. 
226 See infra notes 242–258 and accompanying text. 
227 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). 
228 See Cable, supra note 21, at 120 (“It is a widely held belief that startup companies do 
not have sufficient funding sources.”). 
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more established companies by definition and would thus not have a 
large asset base with which to settle.229 If small business startups pursu-
ing crowdfunding offerings lack the necessary capital to hire account-
ants and underwriters necessary to register in the traditional initial 
public offering process, it stands to reason that they also do not have 
enough capital to attract nuisance suits.230 Thus, attorneys filing strike 
suits against crowdfunding issuers would lack any financially well-
endowed targets to make settlement a viable option.231 
 Furthermore, the very language of Title III’s private right of action 
would prohibit a plaintiff class from shaking down issuers for large set-
tlements.232 Title III prevents individual investors from recovering any-
thing in excess of the cost of purchasing the securities at issue, includ-
ing interest.233 Without the prospect of the plaintiff class seeking 
exorbitant damages, the issuer assumes no chance of risking the sol-
vency of their companies on a jury trial, or being coerced into settling 
for fear of bankrupting the startup.234 
 In addition, the PSLRA sought to end the abuse of the class action 
securities fraud lawsuit by targeting the misbehavior of plaintiffs’ attor-
neys, not the plaintiffs themselves.235 The financial gains to be had 
from a successful class action lawsuit targeting a crowdfunding for secu-
rities fraud would not, however, entice even the most unscrupulous at-
 
229 See id. 
230 See Hemingway & Hoffman, supra note 47, at 908–09. 
231 Compare H.R. Rep. No. 369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (describing Congress’s con-
cern with meritless securities fraud class action lawsuits targeting deep-pocketed issuers), 
with Cable, supra note 21, at 120 (noting that the majority of startups lack sufficient fund-
ing sources). 
232 See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 302(b), § 4A(c)(1)(A), 126 Stat. 306 (2012) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(1)(A) (2012)) (limiting the recovery of plaintiffs to little 
more than their initial investments); see also Diamond, supra note 13, at 1840 (providing 
the president of the NASAA’s observations that class action lawsuits brought by defrauded 
investors against crowdfunding issuers are not likely to be strike suits seeking to shake out 
a settlement). 
233 JOBS Act, at sec. 302(b), § 4A(c)(1)(A). 
234 Compare Gorsuch & Matey, supra note 190, at 2 (quoting In Re Rhone-Pulec Roer, 
Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1294 (7th Cir. 1995)) (noting that between “stak[ing] their companies 
on the outcome of a single jury trial, or be[ing] forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy 
[into settling] even if they have no legal liability,” companies facing potentially overwhelm-
ing damages preferred the latter course), with Hazen, supra note 4, at 1759 (noting that 
small crowdfunding offerings will likely yield modest damages). 
235 H.R. Rep. No. 369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (illustrating that that one of Con-
gress’s concerns prompting passage of the PSLRA was the manipulation of plaintiff classes 
by lawyers motivated by personal gain). 
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torney to bring a strike suit.236 Crowdfunding issuers accused of securi-
ties fraud will have no incentive to settle to avoid risking a potentially 
unfavorable jury decision because of Title III’s limitation on damages 
and because those issuers will, by definition, lack a sufficient asset base 
with which to settle.237 Furthermore, Title III prohibits issuers from sell-
ing securities in amounts exceeding $1 million per crowdfunding offer-
ing.238 Because Title III’s private cause of action only entitles successful 
plaintiffs to receive the consideration paid in exchange for the securi-
ties purchased, the entire judgment for a class action could not exceed 
$1 million.239 As class action lawyers on contingency have traditionally 
taken twenty to thirty percent of the recovery in legal fees, an attorney 
would only stand to make $300,000, assuming that the issuer sold the 
maximum amount of securities allowed by Title III and that each inves-
tor joined the class.240 Without financial incentives, plaintiffs’ lawyers 
will have little motivation to act as principles, rather than as agents 
working on behalf of the plaintiff class.241 
B. Congress Must Reconsider the PSLRA to Create a Workable 
Crowdfunding Exemption 
 Despite having been signed into law in April 2012, the actual im-
plications of Title III of the JOBS Act have yet to be truly felt and meas-
ured.242 Although the JOBS Act compels the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to make rules expanding upon certain provisions 
within 270 days of passage, the SEC missed the deadline and gave no 
                                                                                                                      
236 See Hazen, supra note 4, at 1759 (“[A] relatively small crowdfunding effort will result 
in relatively modest potential damages, thus raising questions regarding the economics of 
bringing such a claim and the adequacy of the economic incentives to plaintiff’s law firms 
to bring suit . . . .”). 
237 Compare Gorsuch & Matey, supra note 190, at 2 (illustrating how companies facing 
potentially overwhelming damages in securities fraud litigation prefer to settle), with JOBS 
Act, at sec. 302(b), § 4A(c)(2)(A) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(2)(A)) (capping dam-
ages available to plaintiff classes in crowdfunding securities fraud litigation), and Hazen, 
supra note 4, at 1759 (noting that small crowdfunding offerings will likely yield modest 
damages), and Cable, supra note 21, at 120 (indicating that crowdfunding issuers are mod-
estly capitalized and will therefore lack a sufficient asset base with which to settle). 
238 JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 302(a), § 4(a)(6)(A), 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (cod-
ified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A) (2012)). 
239 See id. ($1 million offering limit); id. at sec. 302(b), § 4A(c)(1)(A) (recovery limit). 
240 See Perino, supra note 196, at 918 (discussing the contingency fee basis of class ac-
tion lawyers for securities fraud suits). 
241 See Hazen, supra note 4, at 1759. 
242 Traeger et al., supra note 6, at 215. 
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timeframe for when such regulations would be completed.243 Notwith-
standing the SEC’s delay, Congress limited the scope of the SEC’s regu-
latory revision to provisions of the JOBS Act not including the private 
right of redress.244 Short of revising the other anti-fraud provisions of 
the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), 
the SEC cannot directly address the issue of remedies, especially with 
regard to the PSLRA.245 
 Similarly, state securities regulators or legislatures cannot offer de-
frauded small crowdfunding investors any relief from PSLRA cover-
age.246 Securities sold under Title III are “covered,” meaning federal 
legislation preempts state securities laws.247 That states retain the right 
to investigate crowdfunding issuers for securities fraud provides little 
comfort for defrauded small crowdfunding investors.248 
 Starting from the premise that “the best defense is a good offense,” 
Congress should carve-out an exception for crowdfunding offerings in 
the PSLRA itself.249 Including a carve-out in federal securities legisla-
tion is hardly a novel concept; the Securities Litigation Uniform Stan-
dards Act provides limited circumstances in which a shareholder may 
bring an action under the statutory or common law of an issuer’s state 
of incorporation.250 Similarly, the PSLRA could conceivably contain a 
provision exempting certain class action lawsuits brought by defrauded 
crowdfunding investors from coverage.251 
 An exemption to PSLRA coverage for class action lawsuits brought 
by defrauded crowdfunding investors would, ideally, render the 
 
243 See JOBS Act, at sec. 302(c); David Drake, Why Equity Crowdfunding Won’t Happen 
This Year, Forbes, Feb. 19, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2013/02/19/ 
why-equity-crowdfunding-wont-happen-this-year/. The SEC did, however, release rules with 
respect to Title II of the JOBS Act, eliminating the prohibition on general solicitation and 
general advertising in Rule 506 offerings. See Eliminating the Prohibition on General Solicitation 
and General Advertising in Certain Offerings, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n ( July 10, 2013),  
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2013/2013–124-item1.htm. 
244 See Bradford, supra note 12, at 39–41. 
245 See id. 
246 See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 305(a)–(b)(1), 126 Stat. 306 (2012). 
247 See id. 
248 See id. at sec. 305(b)(2). 
249 See infra notes 250–258 and accompanying text. 
250 See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) of 1998, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78bb(f)(3)(A) (2012). SLUSA precludes class actions that allege fraud or misrepresenta-
tion under state law in connection with the purchase or sale of “covered securities.” See id. 
§ 78bb(f)(1)–(3). Covered securities are those “traded nationally and listed on a regulated 
national exchange.” See id. § 78bb(f)(5)(B). 
251 See id. § 78bb(f)(3)(A). 
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PSLRA’s procedural impediments inapplicable to such suits prior to the 
discovery stage.252 Classes of defrauded crowdfunding should be able to 
infer the misstatement and intent elements of a claim rather than plead 
them with particularity.253 Similarly, an exemption to PSLRA coverage 
should preserve Title III’s loss causation burden-shifting scheme, plac-
ing the onus of proving loss causation to the defendant crowdfunding 
issuer.254 Given the limited information available about most startups, 
plaintiff classes would be hard-pressed to plead loss causation with par-
ticularity.255 
 A class action lawsuit brought by small defrauded crowdfunding 
investors will not undermine the public policy goals underlying the 
PSLRA.256 The perceived abuses of the class action vehicle in securities 
fraud litigation would likely be absent from crowdfunding securities 
fraud class action litigation.257 As such, the PSLRA should not hinder 
classes of small defrauded investors in pursuing otherwise meritorious 
                                                                                                                      
252 Compare Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b)(2)(A), (b)(4) (2012) (setting forth the heightened pleading standards for plaintiff 
classes with respect to defendant’s state of mind and loss causation), with Taku, supra note 
10, at 3 (noting that most early-stage business startups have not yet filed tax returns or 
engaged independent public accountants to create audited financial statements). 
253 See Abshure Keynote Address, supra note 89 (advocating against legislative impedi-
ments to class actions by way of amendments to federal law that would permit private law-
suits for fraud associated with small offerings). 
254 Compare PSLRA § 78u-4(b)(1) (requiring plaintiff to “state with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of 
mind”), with JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 302(b), § 4A(c)(2)(B), 126 Stat. 306 
(2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(2)(B) (2012)) (requiring the defendant to dis-
prove loss causation), and Taku, supra note 10, at 3 (illustrating that there is very limited 
information available regarding startups), and Abshure Keynote Address, supra note 89 
(illustrating that the heightened requirements of the PLSRA effectively vitiate the private 
right of action provided by Title III, causing crowdfunding investors to be without mean-
ingful recourse in the event of securities fraud). 
255 Compare PSLRA § 78u-4(b)(1) (requiring plaintiff to “state with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of 
mind”), with Taku, supra note 10, at 3 (noting that most early-stage business startups have 
not yet filed tax returns or engaged independent public accountants to create audited 
financial statements). 
256 See Diamond, supra note 13, at 1840 (providing the president of the NASAA’s ob-
servations that class action lawsuits brought by small crowdfunding investors are not likely 
to be strike suits designed to shake out settlements from issuers that the PSLRA was de-
signed to protect). 
257 See id.; see also Abshure Keynote Address, supra note 89 (noting that the PSLRA was 
passed in response to abusive class actions brought against large publicly traded compa-
nies, not small companies). 
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claims against crowdfunding issuers through Title III’s private right of 
action.258 
Conclusion 
 In the academic debate regarding crowdfunding, the primary ten-
sion lays between the need for small businesses to easily access capital 
and the concern for the protection of investors. Like any two sides of 
the same coin, however, these goals are not mutually exclusive; in fact, 
they cannot exist without one another. State and federal securities regu-
lators agree that investors will not contribute capital to a marketplace in 
which they cannot protect themselves. Without investor confidence in 
the capital markets, true capital formation and subsequent economic 
growth cannot flourish. 
 Although market for crowdfunding offerings has yet to take shape, 
it is not too early to consider the inevitable effects of fraud on future 
offerings. Conceptually, crowdfunding relies on a myriad of small injec-
tions of capital to fund the larger product, but small investors will not 
flock to crowdfunding offerings without the prospect of recouping 
their investments in the event of fraud. For crowdfunding to be success-
ful, potential investors must be able to rely on class action relief before 
fraud occurs. 
 Just as one cannot consider eased capital raising in a vacuum, one 
cannot consider Title III’s crowdfunding exemption without reference 
to the entire landscape of federal securities regulation. Without Con-
gressional action, the PSLRA could deny class action relief to small 
crowdfunding investors in the event of fraud. Because a class action 
lawsuit is the only economically viable means for small, defrauded in-
vestors to pursue redress against crowdfunding issuers for securities 
fraud, the PSLRA ought not to preclude otherwise meritorious class 
action securities fraud lawsuits brought by small crowdfunding inves-
tors. Failure to make an exception for crowdfunding offerings in the 
PSLRA would conflict with the principles underlying the statute and, in 
the long term, discourage crowdfunding investment. 
Thomas G. James 
 
258 See Diamond, supra note 13, at 1839–40 (expressing Heath Abshure’s concern that 
existing federal legislation such as the PSLRA should not create litigation-proof offerings 
by precluding defrauded small investors from suing a crowdfunding issuer as a class). 
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